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Looking Ahead to the 2005-2006 Term 
J ana than H. Adler* 
I. Introduction 
The 2005-2006 term may be as notable for what it says about the 
future direction of the Supreme Court as it is for specific decisions 
in any particular cases. As always, there are high profile cases of 
doctrinal or political significance, but no genuine blockbusters-at 
least not yet. As has been noted before, the Court has a tendency 
of accepting and deciding some of the most important cases later 
in the term.1 Lawrence v. Texas,Z Kelo v. City of New London,3 the 
Michigan affirmative action cases,4 and last term's Ten Command-
ments decisions5 are but a few recent examples. 
This is not to say the 2005-2006 term lacks important cases. Far 
from it. This coming year the Court will consider the constitutionality 
of the Solomon Amendment, address the application of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act to religious use of drugs, and determine 
whether the federal government can effectively preempt Oregon's deci-
sion to legalize doctor-assisted suicide. It will revisit contemporary 
federalism and abortion doctrines, clarify the scope of the Racketeer 
*Jonathan H. Adler is associate professor of law and associate director of the Center 
for Business Law & Regulation at the Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law, where he teaches courses in environmental and constitutional law. 
1See Thomas C. Goldstein, The Upcoming 2004-2005 Term, 2003-2004 Cato Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 493 (2004) (noting that "for several years, the most notable cases have 
coincidentally been selected and argued late in the term"); Michael A. Carvin, Coming 
Up: October Term2003, 2002-2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 280 (2003) ("the most significant 
cases of a Term often include some in which the Court granted certiorari during the 
course of the Term"). 
2539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
3125 s. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
4Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
5McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 
2854 (2005). 
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Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and address 
important questions in antitrust and criminal procedure. Nonethe-
less, the most striking thing about the upcoming term is that we 
will see a change in the Court's composition for the first time in 
over a decade. 
Until Justice Sandra Day O'Connor announced her retirement in 
July, there had been no change in the Court's composition for eleven 
years. This is the longest period nine justices have sat together as a 
Court in the nation's history. Indeed, not since the 1820s, when the 
Court had only seven justices, has the Court gone more than six years 
without any turnover.6 This period of continuity has had several 
important, if somewhat underappreciated, effects. As Thomas Mer-
rill observed, a Court without turnover becomes a "Court in stasis" 
with remarkably stable institutional norms.7 After years together, 
the justices can predict their colleagues' votes, dispositions, and 
inclinations-and therefore the outcomes of individual cases-with 
tremendous confidence. 
A change in the Court's lineup, even one that does not appear to 
alter the ideological make-up of the Court, has the potential to dis-
rupt this equilibrium, change institutional norms, and alter the 
course of existing doctrines.8 Even the shuffling of seniority can have 
important doctrinal effects, insofar as it places the responsibility to 
assign cases in different hands. As a result, it may be more difficult 
to predict outcomes in once-predictable cases. Even routine applica-
tions or clarifications of existing precedent hold the potential to take 
Court decisions in a new direction. This will make the decisions in 
upcoming cases that much more worth court-watchers' attention. 
II. Cases On the Docket 
A. Expressive Association and Conditional Spending 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR)9 is 
almost certainly the case of greatest interest to legal academics, in 
6Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisiting 
the Power Pageant of the Justices, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 131, 134 n.12 (2001). 
7Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 47 St. Louis. U. L.J. 569, 573 (2003). 
BJd. 
'No. 04-1152. 
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no small part because many are themselves parties to the case. 
Rumsfeld v. FAIR presents a constitutional challenge to a federal 
requirement that universities receiving federal funds grant the mili-
tary equal access to campus recruiting opportunities. As such, it 
presents issues of expressive association and Congress' power to 
impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds. 
The case arose out of the controversy over the U.S. military's 
"don't ask, don't tell" policy, which excludes open homosexuals 
from military service.10 This policy is quite controversial, but has 
been upheld repeatedly in federal court.U Most law schools have 
non-discrimination policies that protect sexual preference. On this 
basis, many sought to deny campus access to military recruiters. 
Congress responded by enacting the "Solomon Amendment/' a pro-
vision requiring that universities receiving federal funds provide 
military recruiters with access to campus and students "that is at 
least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to 
students that is provided to any other employer."12 Law professors 
around the country, as well as several law schools, formed FAIR to 
challenge the amendment in court. 
A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
found that the Solomon Amendment violated the plaintiffs' First 
Amendment rights of expressive association and "compel[led] them 
to assist in the expressive act of recruiting."13 There are several 
reasons to doubt whether this holding will be upheld on appeal. 
Most importantly, the Third Circuit adopted a significantly more 
expansive view of the right of association than has been recognized 
by federal courts to date. In addition, even if the Supreme Court 
were sympathetic to the expressive association claim at issue,· the 
Solomon Amendment is not more intrusive than other funding con-
ditions previously upheld in federal court. 14 Add the fact that the 
10 10 U.S.C. § 654 bars homosexuals from military service. 
11 See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634-36 (2d Cir. 1998); Philips v. 
Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1432 (9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 262, 263, 
264 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 934 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane). 
u10 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1). The Solomon Amendment exempts institutions with "a 
longstanding policy of pacifism based on historical religious affiliation." 10 U.S.C. 
§ 983(c)(2). 
13 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 230 (3d Cir. 2004). 
1
'See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 563 (1984) (rejecting First 
Amendment challenge to conditions imposed on federal funding of educational insti-
tutions under Title IX). 
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Supreme Court does not have a long record of challenging military 
policy determinations, and that the parent universities themselves 
are not challenging the funding condition,l5 and it seems FAIR is 
destined to be overturned. 
The Supreme Court has never recognized an absolute right to 
freedom of association. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale16 and Hurley v. 
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston17 recognized 
a right to expressive association, but one that is more limited than 
FAIR's asserted expressive association claim.18 Dale, for instance, 
held that governmental action violates the right of expressive associ-
ation where it "affects in a significant way the group's ability to 
advocate public or private viewpoints."19 Forcing the Boy Scouts to 
accept gay scoutmasters had such an effect because it restricted the 
Boy Scouts' ability to select their own members and leadership. 
Here, however, universities are not being told whom to admit or 
hire, or whose message to endorse. Rather they must allow the 
military to recruit on campus to the same degree as a multitude of 
other employers, representing a multitude of interests and perspec-
tives, are so allowed. Moreover, there is no claim that universities 
or their faculty are in any way prevented or discouraged from criti-
cizing the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy by the government. 
The Solomon Amendment focuses solely on whether military 
recruiters are given "equal access" on campus. The policy does, 
however, effectively prevent law schools from expressing their insti-
tutional values by providing some employers-those that do not 
discriminate against homosexuals-preferential treatment. 
If the Court were to accept FAIR's expressive association claim, 
its Spending Clause charge may have more force. Assuming that 
the federal government could not simply require all universities to 
15See Andrew P. Morriss, The Market for Legal Education & Freedom of Association: 
Why the "Solomon Amendment" Is Constitutional and Law Schools Aren't Expressive 
Associations, Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies No. 05-20 {August 2005), 
available at http:/ /lawwww.cwru.edu/ssm/. 
16530 u.s. 640 (2000). 
17515 u.s. 557 (1995). 
18For a libertarian critique of the limited right of expressive association recognized 
in Dale, see Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case 
of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 119 {2000). 
19Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. 
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permit military recruiting on campus,2° it is not clear why the federal 
government should be able to leverage its substantial funding of 
universities, much of it for research, to overcome the First Amend-
ment rights of universities or university faculties to control the edu-
cational environment. Conditions placed upon federal funding must 
"bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending."21 
The relationship between, for example, federal funding of particle 
physics or medical research and military access to law school career 
service offices is not particularly direct, especially given that the 
Solomon Amendment applies to non-military funding. 
The government's strongest argument here is that the amendment 
enforces a non-discrimination rule, much like that contained in civil 
rights laws such as Title VF and Title IX.23 Such conditions, the 
government will claim, ensure that federal money is not used to 
support discriminatory activities. Whereas the civil rights laws pre-
vent racial and gender-based discrimination, the argument goes, the 
Solomon Amendment bars discrimination against the military in a 
way that undermines Congress' ability to "raise and support" 
arrnies.24 The Court has upheld the application of such conditions 
to university admissions, where the expressive association claim is 
stronger than in FAIR.25 A university's expressive association interest 
in whom it admits, graduates, and hires is greater than a law faculty's 
or affiliated law school's interest in whom is allowed to interview 
students on campus. Moreover, the policy does not impose a signifi-
cant burden on judicially recognized rights of expressive association 
because law faculties and law schools are not required to forego 
oriticism of military policies. Thus, even if the Court does reach the 
conditional spending question, it seems unlikely that FAIR will prevail. 
20This assumption has never been tested and may be questioned given the deference 
often shown to the military by federal courts, and in particular to Congress' power 
to "raise and support" military forces. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 
(1981) ("judicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative action under the 
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations 
for their governance is challenged"). 
21 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). 
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. 
23 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. 
24 U.S. Canst. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
25 See note 14, supra. 
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B. Drug Use and Religious Freedom 
In Employment Division v. Smith/6 the Supreme Court held that 
the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause did not prevent the 
State of Oregon from prohibiting the religious use of peyote.27 In 
the process, the Court rejected the application of strict scrutiny to 
such free exercise claims and held there was no religious exemption 
to valid and neutral laws of general applicability. 28 Congress 
responded by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), which provides that the federal government may "substan-
tially burden a person's exercise of religion" only if the state burden 
serves a "compelling governmental interest" and is the "least restric-
tive means" of furthering that interest.29 
In Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao}0 the Court con-
fronts the question whether RFRA requires the federal government 
to permit the importation, possession, and use of hoasca, a tea con-
taining the hallucinogen DMT, in religious ceremonies. This question 
divided the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en 
bane, which held that members of a religious group were entitled 
to a preliminary injunction barring federal enforcement of the Con-
trolled Substances Act (CSA) as applied to hoasca in religious 
ceremonies. 31 
The federal government maintains that it has compelling interests 
in the uniform enforcement of federal drug laws and in compliance 
with a United Nations drug control treaty that outweigh the religious 
freedom claim at issue. All DMT-containing substances are listed as 
"schedule I" -controlled hallucinogens under the CSA, and Congress 
asserted that schedule I substances have "a high potential for abuse" 
and lack any "currently accepted medical use."32 While Congress, 
26 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
27 Id. at 890. 
28 Id. at 879-82 (rejecting religious exemption from valid and neutral laws of general 
applicability); id. at 886-89 (rejecting strict scrutiny). 
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. As enacted by Congress, RFRA applied to all levels of 
government. RFRA's application to states was, however, struck down in Cih; of 
Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), for exceeding the scope of Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
30No. 04-1084. 
31 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 976 (lOth Cir. 2004). 
3221 U.S.C. § 812 (b)(l)(A)-(C). 
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by enacting RFRA, clearly sought to overturn the standard set forth 
in Smith, the government asserts that RFRA was not intended to 
change the specific result in that case. To the contrary, Congress 
noted its agreement with pre-Smith cases, many of which upheld 
the application of federal drug laws to religious practices.33 
In a powerful opinion below, Judge Michael McConnell argued 
that courts cannot simply defer to government's broad assertion of 
an interest in enforcing its criminal laws. Rather, he argued, RFRA 
requires a case-by-case evaluation of the government's interest and 
whether a given limitation on religious practice advances the govern-
ment's interest in the least restrictive way possible.34 Wrote McCon-
nell, courts "are not free to decline to enforce [RFRA], which neces-
sarily puts courts in the position of crafting religious exemptions to 
federal laws that burden religious exercise without sufficient justifi-
cation."35 Congress made no specific findings about the use of hoasca, 
so courts have less confidence that the blanket prohibition on its 
importation, possession, and use is the least restrictive means of 
fulfilling the government's interest in drug prohibition.36 Given that 
hoasca is a substance little used outside of specific, uncommon reli-
gious ceremonies, it is also questionable whether a ruling against the 
government here would open the floodgates for claims of religious 
exemptions to the CSA. As Judge McConnell noted, it may be easier 
to justify a blanket prohibition on substances that are used more 
widely.37 Moreover, a decision against the government here would 
not preclude Congress from amending either RFRA or the CSA 
to strengthen federal limitations on the religious use of schedule 
I drugs. 
C. Federalism and Assisted Suicide 
The CSA is also front and center in this term's premier federalism 
case, Gonzales v. Oregon,38 much as it was last term in Gonzales v. 
33Brief for the Petitioners at 16-17, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente 
Uniao, No. 04-1084 (U.S. ffied July 2005). 
340 Centro Espirita, 389 F.3d at 1018-31 (McConnell, J., concurring). 
35 Id. at 1020. 
360f course, the government's interest in drug prohibition is itself a question of 
fierce debate. See, e.g., The Crisis in Drug Prohibition (David Boaz ed., 1990). 
370 Centro Espirita, 389 F.3d at 1022-23 (McConnell, J., concurring). 
38 No. 04-623. 
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Raich.39 Whereas Raich focused on California's decision to legalize 
the medical use and possession of marijuana, Oregon concerns the 
Oregon Death with Dignity Act, a state law twice-approved by 
Oregon voters that legalizes doctor-assisted suicide.40 While the issue 
in Raich was the pure constitutional issue of whether federal Com-
merce Clause authority could reach non-commercial marijuana pos-
session and use for medicinal purposes where authorized by state 
law, Oregon presents a narrower issue of statutory construction.41 
Under current Commerce Clause doctrine, there is little question 
that Congress could prohibit doctors from prescribing drugs to help 
their patients kill themselves, yet it has never done so in explicit 
terms.42 Therefore, the question in Oregon is whether an administra-
tive official, in this case the attorney general, can interpret the CSA 
to achieve the same result absent clear congressional assent. 
The CSA erects a comprehensive regulatory scheme covering the 
manufacture, distribution, and sale of controlled substances. In order 
to prevent drug trafficking and abuse, it prohibits the dispensing of 
regulated drugs without a federal registration. Registered doctors 
are further required to dispense controlled substances only "in the 
course of professional practice or research."43 In addition, longstand-
ing federal regulations implementing the CSA require that drug 
prescriptions 'be issued for a legitimate medical purpose."44 In 2001, 
then-Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an interpretive rule 
declaring that assisting suicide is "not a 'legitimate medical pur-
pose,"' even if authorized under state law.45 In effect, the Ashcroft 
39 125 S. Ct. 2195 {2005) (Commerce Clause challenge to federal regulation of medical 
marijuana use and possession authorized by state law). 
400r. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.800-127.995. 
41 Compare Petition for Certiorari at {l), Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005} 
(No. 03-1454) (U.S. filed August2004) (question presented}, with Petition for Certiorari 
at (I), Gonzales v. Oregon, No. 04-623 (U.S. filed May 2005) (question presented). 
420f course, current Commerce Clause doctrine has departed from the original 
meaning of the clause. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original 
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 847 {2003); Randy E. Barnett, The 
Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101 (2001); Richard 
A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1987). 
43 21 u.s.c. § 802(21). 
44 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a). 
45 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (November 9, 2001). 
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directive preempted Oregon's decision to authorize doctors to write 
prescriptions for the purpose of assisting suicides. 
Oregon successfully challenged this directive before the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found that the rule exceeded 
the scope of federal authority under the CSA.46 The key legal issue 
is not the federal government's constitutional authority, but the 
extent to which the CSA authorizes administrative action that dis-
places state authority in areas traditionally left under state control, 
such as the practice of medicine. In 1991, the Supreme Court held 
that federal statutes should not be interpreted to displace state 
authority unless Congress' authorization for such action is "unmis-
takably clear."47 On this basis, the Court has refused to defer to an 
agency interpretation of federal law intruding on traditional state 
authority.48 
Weighed against these arguments is the federal government's 
assertion that the CSA creates a comprehensive and uniform regula-
tory scheme that already confines medical authority to prescribe 
drugs and is administered by the Department of Justice.49 According 
to the federal government, allowing Oregon doctors to prescribe 
federally controlled substances to assist suicides threatens the unifor-
mity of the federal scheme. In addition, there is ample authority to 
support the Justice Department's claim that assisting suicide has 
rarely, if ever, been considered a "legitimate medical purpose" by 
medical authorities. 5° Although Oregon doctors may have more diffi-
culty assisting suicide if they cannot prescribe drugs regulated by 
the CSA the federal government further argues it is not preempting 
E!.tate action, as other means of doctor-assisted suicide (hqwever 
impractical) remain legal under Oregon law.51 
Although the Oregon case turns on the questions of statutory 
interpretation, it is an important federalism case. As the breadth of 
the government's asserted regulatory authority under the CSA and 
46 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004). 
47 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (internal quotation omitted). 
"See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
49See Brief for the Petitioners at 24-37, Gonzales v. Oregon, No. 04-623 (U.S. filed 
May 2005). 
50 Id. at 21-24. 
51 Id. at 13-14. 
329 
CATO SUPREME CoURT REVIEw 
other comprehensive regulatory statutes illustrates, a Court ruling 
addressing federal agencies' authority to preclude state choices will 
have significant ramifications. If courts are to give Congress a wide 
berth in determining the proper exercise of federal power-as the 
Raich decision suggests52-clear statement rules are particularly 
important. If the primary limitation on federal power is to come 
through the political process, then it is that much more important 
that Congress be required to go on record when federal law will 
contravene the policy choices citizens make in their respective states. 
D. State Sovereign Immunity 
The contours of state sovereign immunity may be clarified by two 
additional federalism cases this term. In Central Virginia Community 
College v. Katz,53 the Court will consider whether Congress may 
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy 
Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held Congress 
may do so because the Bankruptcy Clause explicitly empowers Con-
gress to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies through-
out the United States."54 In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 55 Board of Trustees 
v. Garrett, 56 and other cases, however, the Court suggested Congress 
can never abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting pursuant 
to the powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8.57 The Court has 
accepted certiorari on this question before, only to dispose of the 
case on jurisdictional grounds. 58 In Central Virginia, the Court may 
finally determine whether states may be subject to suit for money 
damages under the Bankruptcy Clause, or whether Congress is 
wholly precluded from abrogating state sovereign immunity other 
than through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
52See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Federalism Up in Smoke?, National Review Online, 
June 7, 2005, available at http:/ /www.nationalreview.com/adler/adler200506070921.asp. 
53 No. 04-885. 
54U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; In re Hood, 319 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2003). 
55517 u.s. 44 (1996). 
56531 u.s. 356, 364 (2001). 
57Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73 ("Article I cannot be used to circumvent the 
constitutional limits placed upon federal jurisdiction."); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364 ("Con-
gress may not ... base its abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity 
upon the powers enumerated in Article I."). 
58Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004). 
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A second sovereign immunity case in which certiorari was granted 
requires the Court to revisit the precise scope of abrogation under 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).59 In 2001, the 
Court held that Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign 
immunity under Title I of the ADA.60 In 2004, however, the Court 
upheld the abrogation of state sovereign immunity under Title II of 
the ADA with respect to "the class of cases implicating the accessibil-
ity of judicial services" in Tennessee v. Lane.61 The Lane holding was 
limited, however, in that it did not uphold Title II of the ADA "as 
an undifferentiated whole."62 Whereas the government sought to 
uphold the ADA as equal protection legislation, the Court stressed 
that the case implicated the "fundamental right of access to the courts" 
and not just discrimination against the disabled.63 In this way, Lane 
muddied the waters of the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence. 
In United States v. Georgia (consolidated with Goodman v. Georgia),64 
the Court may restore some clarity as it considers whether Title II 
of the ADA abrogates state sovereign immunity in suits by disabled 
prisoners challenging discrimination by state-operateq prisons. The 
federal government seeks a ruling that Title II abrogates state sover-
eign immunity across the board.65 Barring such a broad ruling, the 
federal government seeks recognition that the poor prison conditions 
alleged implicate fundamental constitutional rights, such as those 
protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, that Congress 
may protect through its Section 5 power, just as the lack of court 
access allowed for abrogation in Lane.66 Georgia, on the other hand, 
will argue that the scope of Title II is far broader than necessary to 
address any constitutional concerns and is therefore not the sort 
of congruent and proportional remedy authorized by Section 5. 
5942 U.S.C. §§ 21131 et seq. 
60 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. 
61 541 u.s. 509, 531 (2004). 
62 Id. at 530. 
63 Id. at 533-34. For more on the Lane ruling, see Robert A. Levy, Tennessee v. Lane: 
How illegitimate Power Negated Non-Existent Immunity, 2003-2004 Cato Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 161, 164-68 (2004). 
64Nos. 04-1203 and 04-1236. 
65 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12 n.6, United States v. Georgia, No. 04-1203 
(U.S. filed March 2005). 
66 Id. at 14-15. 
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Moreover, whereas the federal government will seek to frame the 
issue as one concerning a broad "class of cases,"67 Georgia will seek 
to focus on the specific claims at issue in this specific case and argue 
that prison conditions for the disabled do not implicate constitutional 
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. As in Central Vir-
ginia, the outcome may indicate whether the Court intends to stand 
by its decisions upholding state sovereign immunity. 
E. Abortion 
The Court wades into the unending controversy over abortion 
once again in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England.68 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit struck down the 
New Hampshire Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act69 on 
the grounds that it lacked an explicit health exception and its life 
exception was drawn too narrowly.70 While the statute lacks explicit 
language allowing a doctor to perform an abortion where necessary 
to protect a minor's health, New Hampshire argued that the statute's 
judicial bypass provision provides an equivalent safeguard. The First 
Circuit rejected this argument on the ground that the time required 
for a minor to avail herself of the judicial bypass, even if only a few 
days, could place an undue burden on her ability to obtain an abor-
tion and, in a non-trivial number of cases, may increase risks to the 
minor's health.71 
Also at issue in Ayotte is the proper standard of review in abortion 
cases. Under United States v. Salerno,72 courts confronted with a facial 
challenge to a validly enacted statute must uphold the law unless 
there is "no set of circumstances" under which it could be constitu-
tionaF3 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey/4 
67 I d. at 15 ("[T]he court of appeals here should have assessed Title IT's constitutional-
ity as applied to the entire 'class of cases' ... implicating, in this Court's words, 'the 
aclrrllnistration of ... the penal system."'). 
68 No. 04-1144. 
69 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 132:24-28 (2003). 
70 Planned Parenthood of Northern New England v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 62 (1st 
Cir. 2004). 
71Jd. 
72481 u.s. 739 (1987). 
73 Id. at 745. First Amendment challenges to speech restrictions are an obvious 
exception to this rule. 
74505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
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however, the Court seemed to adopt a different standard for abortion 
cases, holding that any law that has "the purpose or effect of placing 
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
of a nonviable fetus" imposes an "undue burden" on a woman's 
right to an abortion, and is therefore unconstitutionaF5 The First 
Circuit adopted this approach in considering the New Hampshire 
law, following the approach adopted in most circuits.76 Of those to 
consider the question, only the Fifth Circuit has held that the Salerno 
"no set of circumstances" test survives Casey in the abortion context.77 
The Court is also likely to reconsider the constitutional protection 
of partial-birth abortion. In Stenberg v. Carhart/8 the Court narrowly 
struck down Nebraska's ban on the dilation and extraction method of 
abortion, commonly known as "D&X" or "partial-birth abortion."79 
Among other reasons, the Court held the law unconstitutional 
because it failed to include an exception for cases in which the 
procedure was necessary to preserve the health of the mother.80 In 
response to Stenberg, Congress enacted a federal ban on partial-birth 
abortion.81 Like the Nebraska law, the federal act contains a life 
exception, but no health exception.82 Unlike the Nebraska law, it also 
includes express congressiomil findings that partial-birth abortion is 
"never medically necessary" and that the procedure itself can pose 
a risk to the mother's health.83 
75 I d. at 877. 
76See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 
142-43 (3d Cir. 2000); Planned Parenthood of Southern Arizona v. Lawall, 180 F.3d 
1022, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999), amended on denial of rehearing, 193 F.3d 1042 (9th 
Cir. 1999); Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 193-96 
(6th Cir. 1997); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1116 (lOth Cir. 1996); Planned 
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1456-58 (8th Cir. 1995). 
77See Causeway Medical Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1997); 
Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 14 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992). Cf. A Woman's Choice-East Side 
Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002) (attempting to reconcile the 
apparent conflict between Salemo and Caset;). 
78530 u.s. 914 (2000). 
79 Id. at 945-46. 
80Jd. at 938. 
81 Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (2003), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531. 
82 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a). 
83 Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201. 
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Despite these findings, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit struck down the law earlier this year.84 It held that Stenberg 
established a per se constitutional rule that all abortion restrictions 
must contain a health exception, even if the legislature believes that 
a given procedure is never necessary to protect the mother's health. 
As of this writing, a petition for certiorari is likely, and the Court 
typically agrees to review lower court decisions striking down fed-
eral statutes. As Justice O'Connor provided the fifth vote to strike 
down the Nebraska statute in Stenberg, this is one area in which the 
impact of her departure from the Court may be seen immediately. 
F. Civil RICO 
In a 1989 speech at a Cato Institute conference, Judge David Sen-
telle famously remarked that RlCO-the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act-was "the monster that ate jurispru-
dence."85 Although written to combat organized crime, the statute's 
civil and criminal provisions have become powerful weapons 
against all manner of targets, expanding the scope and severity of 
federal criminal law. In the corning term, the Supreme Court may 
determine whether the beast's size, and appetite, will continue to 
grow in the civil context. 
The 2005-2006 term includes round three of perhaps the most 
infamous civil RlCO case of all time, Scheidler v. National Organization 
for Women. Nearly two decades ago, the National Organization for 
Women (NOW) and a nationwide class of abortion clinics sued 
abortion protesters under RlCO's civil provisions. NOW and its co-
plaintiffs averred that abortion protests including blockades of clinic 
entrances amounted to a "pattern" of "racketeering activity," includ-
ing the RlCO predicate offense of "extortion" tmder the federal 
Hobbs Act,86 entitling the plaintiffs to substantial monetary relief. 
In 1994, the Supreme Court held that RlCO did not require that the 
alleged "racketeering activity" have an economic motive, allowing 
the case to proceed to trial. 87 After an extensive trial, which resulted 
84 Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005). 
85 David B. Sentelle, RICO: The Monster that Ate Jurisprudence, Remarks at the 
Cato Institute Conference: RICO, Rights & the Constitution (Oct. 18, 1989) (copy on 
file with author). 
86 18 u.s.c. § 1951. 
87National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) (Scheidler I). 
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in a nationwide injunction against abortion clinic blockades and a 
verdict for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court overturned the verdict, 
holding that the abortion protesters' actions did not constitute 
"extortion" under the Hobbs Act because they had not wrongfully 
"obtained" any "property."88 
Now the Scheidler case is back again, after the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit held that a small portion of NOW's original 
case-that involving four of the 121 alleged predicate acts-survived 
Scheidler II because it was not included in the previous grant of 
certiorari.89 Petitioners in Scheidler III claim that the Seventh Circuit's 
order was explicitly precluded by Scheidler II and would be happy 
with a s1..unmary reversal. Yet the cert. grant includes two additional 
questions that may catch the Court's attention: (1) whether the Hobbs 
Act criminalizes acts or threats of physical violence that are uncon-
nected to either extortion or robbery as the Seventh Circuit suggested 
(though did not decide) and (2) whether injunctive relief is available 
in .a private civil action under RICO for treble damages.90 
The first question is interesting insofar as it induces the Court to 
consider the scope of federal criminal law. If the Hobbs Act were 
to extend to all acts or threats of violence that obstruct or affect 
commerce in some way, it would become an incredibly sweeping 
federal criminal statute. It would also bring all manner of local 
violent crimes within RICO's reach as potential predicate acts. The 
Court may avoid this question, however, on the ground that the 
Seventh Circuit's order did not squarely present the issue. The sec-
ond question was before the Court in Scheidler II, but was never 
·reached because the Court reversed the underlying judgment. As a 
consequence, this case provides the Court with another opportunity 
to consider whether RICO allows private litigants to seek equitable 
relief to enjoin criminal acts. 
A second RICO case, Bank of China v. NBM LLC/1 presents the 
question whether a civil RICO plaintiff alleging mail, wire, or bank 
88Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (Scheidler II). 
89 National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 91 Fed. Appx. 510 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(unpublished order), petition for reh'g en bane denied, 396 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2005). 
90See, e.g., Petition for Certiorari at (i), Scheidler v. National Organization for 
Women, No. 04-1244 (U.S. filed March, 16, 2005) (question presented). 
91 No. 03-1559. 
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fraud as a predicate act must demonstrate "reasonable reliance." 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that unless 
there was reliance upon the alleged fraud, a civil RICO plaintiff 
cannot show that the alleged fraud was the "proximate cause" of 
the alleged injury.92 The petitioners argue that such a showing is not 
required under the text of the statute, which requires that the alleged 
fraud be the "reason" for the plaintiff's injury, whereas the respon-
dents argue that fraud cannot be the cause of a given injury unless 
there was reliance by someone. Although the Justice Department 
often argues for .a more expansive interpretation of the RICO stat-
ute/3 the solicitor general's office sided with the respondent in Bank 
of China, defending the Second Circuit's holding and opposing the 
grant of certiorari. 94 
Over the s1.lmmer, the Justice Department petitioned for certiorari 
in a third civil RICO case that the Court may be likely to grant, 
United States v. Philip Morris USA.95 In 1999, the federal government 
filed suit against the tobacco industry alleging the industry engaged 
in a criminal enterprise to cover up the health risks of smoking. 
Among other things, the Justice Department sought equitable relief 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a), which authorizes federal courts to fashion 
injunctive relief "to prevent and restrain" RICO violations. As part 
of the requested relief, the Justice Department sought disgorgement 
of all proceeds obtained through RICO violations, an estimated $280 
billion-an amount greater than the tobacco companies' combined 
net worth. 96 
On an interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that section 1964(a) is limited to 
"forward-looking remedies" that actually "prevent and restrain" 
future RICO violations. Because disgorgement is, by its very nature, 
"a remedy aimed at past violations," the majority held, it "does not 
so prevent or restrain."97 The D.C. Circuit rejected both the federal 
92 359 F.3d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 2004). 
93See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
94 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Bank of China v. NMB LLC, No. 
03-1559 (U.S. ffied May 2005). 
95No. 05-92. 
96See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005). 
97 I d. at 1192. 
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government's aggressive interpretation of the RICO statute, as well 
as the interpretation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, which had previously held that section 1964(a) allows the 
government to seek disgorgement of those proceeds that "are being 
used to fund or promote the illegal conduct, or constitute capital 
available for that purpose."98 The resulting circuit split increases the 
likelihood that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari, even though 
a refusal to hear the case virtually guarantees a settlement between 
the industry and federal government. 
RICO is already an exceedingly broad statute. This case threatens 
to broaden it even further. The federal government has ample 
authority under RICO to seek disgorgement or other punitive sanc-
tions through its criminal provisions. Proceeding under those provis-
ions, however, requires the government to abide by costly proce-
dural safeguards that attend to a criminal prosecution, not the least 
of which is the government's higher burden of proof. By pursuing 
this case under RICO's civil provisions, however, the government 
gets to take advantage of a lower burden of proof-"preponderance 
of evidence" instead of "beyond a reasonable doubt" -even though 
it seeks what amounts to a criminal remedy. Were the Court to 
uphold this tactic, it would greatly increase the pressure the federal 
government could bring in civil RICO cases against all manner of 
defendants and make RICO an even bigger monster than it already is. 
G. Criminal Procedure 
If a man's home is his castle, may his wife consent to a police 
s.earch of the premises over his objection? When the police arrived 
at the Randolph household on July 6, 2001 in response to a domestic 
call, they asked Scott Randolph for permission to search the house 
for drugs. He refused. The police then turned to his wife, Janet 
Randolph, who had made the initial police call. Not only did Janet 
consent, she led the police into the home to a room containing 
drug paraphernalia. A subsequent search of the premises uncovered 
twenty-five drug-related items.99 
The trial court denied Scott Randolph's effort to suppress the 
evidence, on the ground that his wife had "common authority" to 
98 United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995). 
99 See Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 835 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (summarizing facts). 
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consent to a police search of the marital home. The Supreme Court 
of Georgia disagreed.ID0 Had Scott not been present, however, the 
search would have been upheld. Under United States v. Matloclc,101 
the police may obtain consent to a search from a third party who 
has "common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the 
premises or effects sought to be inspected."102 As generally under-
stood, if a reasonable police officer would believe that the consenting 
party has authority over the premises, the search is permissible. 
Georgia v. Randolph103 presents a related question: whether such 
consent can be given over the present objection of the criminal 
suspect who himself has common authority over the premises to 
be searched? 
Were the .question simply a matter of property law, and who has 
actual authority to consent to a search of the premises, the police 
would have a strong case. If, on the other hand, what matters is 
whether a reasonable police officer would believe there is actual 
consent-in a sense, whether one occupant is speaking for the house-
hold-Randolph presents a trickier question. There is no reason for 
police to assume that one occupant speaks for the other when he is 
objecting then and there. A homeowner may assume the risk that 
another occupant may vicariously consent to a search when the 
owner is away, but that assumption cannot be made when the owner 
is present and objecting. Georgia claims the defense seeks a rule 
under which the validity of a search is contingent upon the police's 
timing, as there would have been no problem if the police had asked 
Janet Randolph to search the house before Scott came home, or after 
he left.104 According to the state, such a rule would focus "arbitrarily 
on the rights of the objecting occupant, to the detriment of the 
consenting occupant ... who ha[s] just as much access and control 
over the home."105 Perhaps so, but in Randolph and similar cases, 
100 604 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 2004). 
101 415 u.s. 164 (1974). 
102 Id. at 171. 
103 No. 04-1067. 
104 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Georgia v. Randolph, No. 04-1067, 2005 WL 
309364 (U.S. filed Feb. 4, 2005). 
105Jd. 
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it is the objecting occupant's Fourth Amendment rights that are 
at issue. 
In Wilson v. Arlcansas/06 the Court held the Fourth Amendment 
requires police to "knock and announce" before entering a home, 
absent exigent circumstances.107 Hudson v. Michigan108 presents the 
question left unanswered in Wilson: whether evidence obtained after 
a "knock and announce" violation is subject to the exclusionary 
rule, or whether, as the Michigan Supreme Court has held, "suppres-
sion of evidence is not the appropriate remedy" for such violations.109 
Ultimately at issue in Hudson is whether "knock and announce" 
violations are to have any meaningful remedy at all. Whereas evi-
dence obtained after a Fourth Amendment violation is typically 
excluded from trial, prosecutors may seek to have evidence admitted 
that would have been "inevitably discovered" had the police com-
plied with relevant constitutional requirements.110 The doctrine does 
not excuse the police from obtaining a warrant, however, as such 
a rule would effectively make warrants irrelevant to evidentiary 
admissibility. In a sense, the doctrine operates to put the police, and 
the defendant, in the same position as if the constitutional violation, 
and accompanying search, had never occurred. If the evidence 
would have been discovered independently of the violation, it gets 
in; otherwise it's suppressed. 
In Hudson, the government maintained that evidence uncovered 
during the search of Hudson's home would have been inevitably 
discovered because the police had a valid warrant, even if they 
did not "knock and announce" before they entered the home.111 If 
accepted by the Court, this reasoning has the potential to expand 
106514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
107 Id. at 936-37. 
108No. 04-1360. 
109See People v. Hudson, No. 246403, 2004 WL 1366947 (Mich. Ct. App. June 17, 
2004) (unpublished order) (citing People v. Vasquez, 602 N.W.2d 376 (Mich. 1999), 
and People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. 1999)), appeal denied, 692 N.W.2d 385 
(Mich. 2005). See also People v. Hudson, No. 230594 (Mich. Ct. App. May 1, 2001) 
(tmpublished order) (same). 
110 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984) ("when, as here, the evidence in 
question would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error 
or misconduct ... the evidence is admissible"). 
111 See Answer of Respondent, Hudson v. Michigan, No. 04-1360 (U.S. filed April 
13, 2005). 
339 
CATO SUPREME CouRT REVIEw 
the "inevitable discovery" doctrine. Just as applying inevitable dis-
covery to the warrant requirement itself could eliminate the incentive 
to obtain a valid warrant, civil liberties advocates worry that an 
inevitable discovery rule could eviscerate the "knock and announce" 
requirement. It is one thing to allow police to show why "knock 
and announce" was inappropriate in a given case, perhaps because 
a suspect would have fled or destroyed evidence. It is quite another 
to hold, as has the Michigan Supreme Court, that the inevitable 
discovery doctrine creates an across-the-board exception to the 
exclusionary rule for "knock and announce" violations.112 
Turning to the Fifth Amendment, in Maryland v. Blake113 the Court 
will consider the circumstances under which a court will presume a 
criminal sm~pect voluntarily initiated communication with the police 
after initially invoking his right to counsel. As every American-or 
at least every American who watches cop shows on television-
knows, criminal suspects must be informed of their Miranda rights, 
including the right to refuse to answer police questions without the 
presence of an attorney, and must also voluntarily waive such rights 
before the police may interrogate them.114 Any statement made to 
the police absent such a waiver is inadmissible in court. 
To address concerns that police might badger criminal suspects 
into waiving their Miranda rights before the arrival of counsel, the 
Court subsequently held that the simple reiteration of the Miranda 
warning provides insufficient evidence that subsequent statements 
to police made without counsel are voluntary and therefore admissi-
ble in court.115 While a suspect may, of his own volition, re-initiate 
communication with the police, once the right to counsel is invoked, 
police must refrain from any conduct that could resemble interroga-
tion. The question in Blake is whether curative measures, other than 
a break in custody or significant lapse in time, can neutralize the 
harm of improper questioning and render subsequent statements 
made without the presence of counsel admissible. Rather than a 
sh·ong presumption that subsequent uncounseled statements were 
112See supra note 109. 
113No. 04-373. 
114See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966). 
115Edwards v Arizona, 451 U.S 477, 487 (1981). 
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involuntary, Maryland (and the federal government) urge a more 
flexible inquiry into whether other curative measures sufficiently 
reduce the risk of badgering or subtle coercion to make a suspect's 
statements admissible. 116 
H. Freedom of Speech 
Two cases this term probe the proper standard for evaluating 
the constitutionality of alleged government retaliation for protected 
speech. The first case, Hartman v. Moore,117 pits the constitutional 
values of separation of powers and the First Amendment against 
each other. In the decision under review, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit broke ranks with several other circuits to hold 
that law enforcement agents may be liable for retaliatory prosecution 
in violation of the First Amendment even if the prosecution was 
supported by probable cause.U8 Once a plaintiff can show tl1at his 
protected speech-in this case, criticism of the U.S. Postal Service 
and related political activities-was the motivating factor in the 
government's decision to press charges, the D.C. Circuit held that 
the burden shifts to the government officials to demonstrate that 
they would have pursued the case anyway, reasoning that probable 
cause "usually represents only one factor among many in the deci-
sion to prosecute."119 While probable cause is all that is necessary 
to support a prosecution, and courts should not lightly intrude upon 
prosecutorial discretion, the D.C. Circuit refused to preclude liability 
"in those rare cases where strong motive evidence combines with 
weak probable cause," reasoning that such circumstances allow a 
court to conclude that an individual had been prosecuted in retalia-
tion for exercising constitutionally protected rights.120 Yet, allowing 
this ruling to stand, the federal government maintains, could chill 
legitimate law enforcement actions against politically vocal individuals 
116See Brief for Petitioner at 18-25, Maryland v. Blake, No. 04-373 (U.S. filed Jun. 
9, 2005); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15-20, 
Maryland v. Blake, No. 04-373 (U.S. filed Jun. 9, 2005). 
117No. 04-1495. 
118 Moore v. Hartman, 388 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
119 Id. at 878. 
l2D Id. at 881. 
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and encourage excessive judicial investigation of executive branch 
decisionmaking at the expense of executive discretion.121 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,121 the Court will reconsider the extent to 
which a public employee's job-related speech is protected by the 
First Amendment. Under Pickering v. Board of Education,123 a court 
must balance "the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in com-
menting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, 
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services 
it performs through its employees."124 Where a public employee is 
sanctioned for speech that is not part of her job, such as writing a 
letter to the editor critical of a government policy, the speech is 
clearly protected. Yet, where a government employee is speaking 
as part of her job responsibilities, the extent of First Amendment 
protection is less clear. 
In Garcetti, a local prosecutor claims he was subject to adverse 
employment actions because he authored a memorandum question-
ing the veracity of a prosecution witness and was subsequently 
called to testify for the defense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that the memorandum was protected speech 
because it addressed a matter of public concern, outweighing the 
government's interest: as an employerY5 Therefore the retaliation, if 
proven, could violate the prosecutor's First Amendment rights. Were 
this speech not protected, the court held, government employees 
could be sanctioned for exposing government malfeasance.126 The 
government, for its part, maintains that the prosecutor's memo was 
not protected by the First Amendment, as it was merely one of his 
job-related duties and did not contain speech made "as a citizen," 
as opposed to as a government employee. Freedom of expression 
is a personal right, and "when a public employee speaks in carrying 
out his job duties, he has no personal interest in the speech."127 
121 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19-22, Hartman v. Moore, No. 04-1495 
(U.S. filed May 2005). 
122No. 04-473. 
123391 u.s. 563 (1968). 
124 Id. at 568. 
125Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004). 
126ld. at 1176. 
127Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Garcetti 
v. Ceballos, No. 04-473 (U.S. filed May 2005). 
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The government's position, in effect, is that any protection for such 
speech must come from whistleblower protection statutes, and the 
like, rather than from the Constitution. To paraphrase Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, a government employee may have right to free 
speech, but he does not have a right to a job.128 
I. Antitrust 
A trio of antitrust cases this term provides the Court with the 
opporhmity to clarify and modernize the law governing competition. 
In each case, interestingly enough, the federal government is on 
the side of the petitioner, urging the Court to overturn outdated 
precedent, eschew formalist rules that ignore efficiency gains from 
what might otherwise appear to be anticompetitive conduct, and 
clarify the scope of antitrust scrutiny. Together, the three cases 
should continue the trend of rationalizing antitrust law and lessening 
its potential to impede business innovation and entrepreneurial 
activity. 
Leading the pack is Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, 129 a direct 
challenge to a long-standing, if outmoded, Supreme Court precedent 
concerning the legality of selling patented or copyrighted products 
subject to tying arrangements.130 illinois Tool Works (ITW) manufac-
tures patented ink jet printheads used for printing barcodes and 
carton labels. ITW markets the printheads in conjunction with its 
own unpatented inks. Buyers of ITW printheads are contractually 
obligated to purchase ITW-supplied ink as well. Independent Ink, 
an ink manufacturer, alleged ITW committed a Sherman Act viola-
tion by tying the printhead and ink sales in this manner. According 
to Iri.dependent, ITW had market power, as a matter of law under 
existing precedent, due to its printhead patent.131 
128McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.) 
(a policeman "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman"). 
129 No. 04-1329. 
130
"A tying arrangement is an agreement by a party to sell one product but only 
on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product ... " 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
131 Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1344-45 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (summarizing facts). 
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For over four decades, an antitrust defendant who holds a patent 
or copyright to a product has been presumed to have market power, 
making the tying arrangement illegal under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.132 In United States v. Loew's, Inc.,133 the Supreme Court adopted 
a virtual per se rule against tying arrangements involving patented 
or copyrighted products. Such arrangements are subject to antitrust 
scrutiny where the seller has "market power"-the power to charge 
prices above competitive levels or otherwise force purchasers to do 
something they would not do in a competitive market. In Loew' s the 
Court held that "[t]he requisite economic power is presumed when 
the tying product is patented or copyrighted." 134 The Court's 
assumption in Loew's was that the existence of a patent or copyright 
was itself evidence of market power, owing to the "uniqueness" or 
"distinctiveness" necessary to patent or copyright the product in 
question. 135 Antitrust jurisprudence at the time was highly suspicious 
of any tying arrangements whatsoever, and the law and economics 
scholarship on the potential efficiency gains from tying was still 
undeveloped. 
The district court disagreed with Independent, observing that the 
Loew's presumption dated from "a time when genuine proof of 
power in the market for the tying product was not required."136 
Today, however, market power must be proven when alleging that 
a given tying arrangement is illegal. Not even the antitrust enforcers 
at the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice pre-
sume that patents and copyrights necessarily confer marketpower. 137 
While appreciating the district court's critique of the Loew' s presump-
tion, the three judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit felt bound by existing precedent.138 
While never overruled, the Loew's rationale has been subject to 
extensive criticism. The academic commentary is nearly unanimous 
13215 u.s.c. § 1. 
133 371 u.s. 38 (1962). 
134 Id. at 45. 
135Id. at 45, 46. 
136Independent Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1165 n.10 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002). 
137United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, §§ 2.2, 5.3 (1995). 
138 396 F.3d 1342, 1348-49, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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in its condemnation of the Loew's rule. As Judge Richard Posner 
observed, "most patents confer too little monopoly power to be a 
proper object of antitrust concern. Some patents confer no monopoly 
power at all."139 Several justices have echoed this view, most notably 
in Justice O'Connor's noted plurality in Jefferson Parish Hospital Dis-
trict No. 2 v. Hyde. 140 The American Bar Association, among others, 
filed briefs supporting illinois Tool Works' petition for certiorari so 
that Loew's could be overruled.141 A decision overturning Loew's 
seems likely. The question is whether the existence of a patent will 
be entitled to any weight at all in a market power determination. 
Texaco v. Dagher (consolidated with Shell Oil Company v. Dagher)142 
presents the question whether it is per se illegal under section 1 of 
the Sherman Act for a joint venture to set the prices at which it sells 
its own products. In 1998, Texaco and Shell Oil formed two wholly-
owned joint ventures-one for the eastern United States (Motiva), 
the other for the West (Equilon)-encompassing the entirety of their 
respective refining and marketing operations in the United States. 
Although the joint ventures would continue to sell gasoline under 
both the Shell and Texaco brands, each in their respective geographic 
region, neither company would retain a financial stake in the gaso-
line bearing its name, as profits from the ventures were to be distrib-
uted based upon each company's investment. Pursuant to the joint 
venture agreement, gasoline under each label would sell for the 
same price.143 
The case arose with the filing of a class-action lawsuit on behalf 
of service station owners alleging that the joint venture's common 
pricing scheme was an illegal"restraint of trade" under the Sherman 
139Richard Posner, Antitrust Law 197-98 (2d ed. 2001). 
140466 U.S. 2, 37 n.7 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the 
"common misconception ... that a patent or copyright ... suffices to demonstrate 
market power" and that "a patent holder has no market power in any relevant sense 
if there are close substitutes for the patented product"). 
141 See, e.g., Motion to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of the American Bar 
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Tilinois Tool Works, Inc. v. 
Independent Ink, Inc., No. 04-1329 (U.S. filed May 5, 2005). 
142Nos. 04-805 and 04-814. 
143Dagher v. Saudi Refining, Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1111-13 (9th Cir. 2004) (summariz-
ing facts). 
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Act.144 After the oil companies won a summary judgment in the 
district court, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that the decision to set a single gasoline price 
within the joint venture could be per se illegal price fixing under 
the Sherman Act if the setting of a single price is not "reasonably 
necessary to further the legitimate aims of the joint venture."145 
The solicitor general's office filed an amicus brief in support of 
Texaco and Shell, arguing that the Ninth Circuit "plainly erred" in 
concluding that the joint venture's pricing of its own products" could 
result in a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act."146 
Antitrust doctrine has long recognized that when "partners set the 
price of their goods or services they are literally 'price fixing,' but 
they are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act."147 Rather, where 
the setting of prices, or other potentially anti-competitive conduct, 
is "ancillary" to a legitimate joint venture, it should be subject to 
rule of reason analysis, if subject to antitrust scrutiny at all. 
A joint venture's ability to set the prices for its own products 
would seem quite integral to the success of the joint venture. Indeed, 
it is hard to imagine how the Texaco-Shell joint venture could operate 
at all if it were not able to set the prices for its own products. As a 
single firm, whether it chose to set the prices for Shell and Texaco 
gasoline at the same or varying levels is immaterial in terms of 
its competitive impact. As Judge Ferdinand Fernandez noted in 
his dissent: 
In this case, nothing more radical is afoot than the fact that an 
entity, which now owns all of the production, transportation, 
research, storage, sales and distribution facilities for engag-
ing in the gasoline business, also prices its own products.148 
The decision to create the joint venture in the first place is subject 
to antitrust scrutiny under the Sherman Act, but once the joint ven-
ture is created, it is hard to see what legitimate purpose is served 
by subjecting internal pricing decisions to further scrutiny. In the 
144 The only claims at issue in this case concern the western joint venture, Equilon. 
145369 F.3d at 1121. 
146 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, Nos. 
04-805 and 04-814 (U.S. filed May 2005). 
147Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979). 
148Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1127 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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unlikely event it is upheld, the Ninth Circuit's opinion could have 
a chilling effect on the creation of joint ventures among potentially 
competing firms, even though such ventures can have tremendous 
economic benefits.149 
The third antitrust case before the Court next term, Volvo Trucks 
North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. 150 arises under the Rob-
inson-Patman Act (RP A) rather than the Sherman Act. Under the 
RP A, sellers may not "discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality ... where the effect 
of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition 
.•• "
151 The RPA is traditionally enforced in the context of sales of 
fungible goods and was intended to prevent a seller from favoring 
one purchaser over another. Volvo Trucks, however, raises the price 
discrimination concern in the context of competitive bidding. Specifi-
cally, the question is how to apply the RP A's prohibition in the 
context of special order products that are made for and sold to 
individual, pre-identified customers after competitive bidding 
through resellers that are not directly competing against one another. 
Volvo argues that the RPA should not apply to its conduct as it 
is not engaging in price discrimination between dealers competing 
to sell its products to the same customers. If Volvo provides greater 
price concessions to some dealers over others, it is not doing so in 
an anti-competitive fashion. Reeder-Simco GMC, a truck dealership, 
argued that any practice of giving some dealers greater price conces-
sions than others was illegal price discrimination under the RPA.152 
Again the solicitor general's office supported the petition forcer-
tiorari, counseling a more modest interpretation of federal antitrust 
law so as to give private firms a wider berth. Specifically, the solicitor 
general argued that the RP A only bans price discrimination between 
competing purchasers. Applying the RP A here, the solicitor general's 
brief argued, "could severely restrict a manufacturer's ability to 
149 See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,768 (1984) 
("combinations, such as mergers, joint ventures, and various vertical agreements, 
hold the promise of increasing a firm's efficiency and enabling it to compete more 
effectively"). 
150No. 04-905. 
151 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). 
152Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11-13, Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. 
Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., No. 04-905 (U.S. filed May 2005) (describing arguments). 
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compete effectively with other manufacturers. It would sacrifice 
vibrant inter brand competition, the primary concern of antitrust law, 
for an illusory gain in intrabrand competition."153 
III. More to Come 
If recent practice is any guide, the Court has filled only half of its 
docket for the year. In addition to the cases noted above, there are 
quite a few high-profile issues that could wind up on the Court's 
plate. For instance, the Court may consider the extent to which the 
dormant Commerce Clause limits the ability of state governments 
to encourage in-state economic development through the use of tax 
credits and other fiscal instruments. In Cuno v. Daimler Chrsyler/54 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Ohio's 
franchise tax credit for additional manufacturing investment made 
by in-state firms was unconstitutionaLl55 The court rejected Daimler's 
argument that the policy benefited in-state investment instead of 
penalizing out-of-state investment.156 A Supreme Court decision in 
Cuno coul,d have a substantial effect on states' use of tax credits 
and other investment incentives to attract, or maintain, business 
investment within the state. 
Qn the environmental front, the Court may be asked to consider 
whether the Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gases/57 as maintained by 
several states and environmentalist groups, as well as the extent of 
the EPA's authority to force decades-old coal-fired power plants to 
adopt newer pollution control equipment in the course of routine 
maintenance and repairs.158 The Court may also seek to resolve the 
brewing circuit split on the scope of the EPA's authority under the 
Clean Water Act. While most circuits have interpreted the Court's 
2001 decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Coole CounhJ v. U.S. 
153Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, Volvo 
Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., No. 04-905 (U.S. filed May 
2005) (internal citations omitted). 
154386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. April 
18, 2005) (No. 04-1407). 
155Id. at 746. 
156Id. at 745. 
157Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 03-1361, 2005 WL 1653055 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2005). 
158See generally United States v. Duke Energy, 411 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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Anny Corps of Engineers159 quite broadly, the Fifth Circuit has held 
the decision places substantial limits on EPA regulatory authority.160 
Therefore, one or more petitions for certiorari on this issue are possible. 
Much of the above may be overshadowed should the Court, as 
expected, agree to hear one or more cases relating to the "war on 
terror" this term. In July, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit upheld the executive's decision to try Salim Ahmed Hamdan 
by military commission.161 Hamdan was captured in Afghanistan 
and is reported to have been a bodyguard and personal driver for 
Osama bin Laden. The D.C. Circuit held that the use of military 
commissions was authorized by Congress162 and rejected Hamdan's 
claims that such a trial would violate the 1949 Geneva Convention 
governing the treatment of prisoners.163 
In addition to the Hamdan case, the Court could also agree to hear 
the Guantanamo detainee cases, consolidated and currently pending 
before the D.C. Circuit.164 A petition of certiorari is also expected, 
once again, in the case of Jose Padilla, currently pending before the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.165 While the Supreme 
Court's decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld upheld the detention and trial 
of an "enemy combatant" captured on foreign soil,l66 the Padilla case 
would force the Court to consider whether an American citizen, 
apprehended on American soil, can also be held and tried as an 
"enemy combatant." Any single one of these cases could have a 
significant effect on civil liberties and the federal government's anti-
terrorism efforts, and there is a reasonable chance the Court could 
end up hearing all three. 
159531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
160See In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2003); see generally Rice v. 
Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001). Although Needham and Rice 
specifically address the scope of federal regulation over "waters of the United States" 
.under the Oil Pollution Act (OP A), both decisions note that federal jurisdiction under 
the OPA was intended to be coextensive with that under the Clean Water Act. 
Needham, 354 F.3d at 344; Rice, 250 F.3d at 267. 
161 Hamdan v. Rurnsfeld, No. 04-5393, 2005 WL 1653046 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2005). 
162 Id. at *4. 
163 Id. at *6. 
164 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, Nos. 05-8003 and 05-5064 (D.C. Cir. consoli-
dated on March 10, 2005). 
165Padilla v. Hanft, No. 05-6396 (4th Cir. oral argument held July 19, 2005). 
166542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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